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4.

JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section
78-2a-3(2)(a)(b).
5,

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

The Appellant's appeal is from an order from the Third
District Court affirming the decision of the Salt Lake County
Career Service Council termination of the Appellant's employment
with Salt Lake County,
6.
a.

THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether Rule 65B(b)(2) U.R.C.P., governs the standard

of review.
b.

Whether the hearing held before the Career Service

Council comported with minimum due process requirement.
c.

Whether this Court should set aside the Decision of

the Salt Lake County Career Service Council.
d.

Whether the test set forth in Vetterli v. Civil

Service Commission of Salt Lake City, is applicable to the
above-entitled case.
e.

Can prior misconduct of the Appellant be used by his

employer to determine the severity of a penalty?
7.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves an appeal from an order denying the
Appellant's Petition for Extraordinary Relief brought pursuant to
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Rule 65B(b)(2)/ U.R.C.P.

The following facts were found by the

Salt Lake County Career Service Council in their written Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision, dated 3rd day of
December, 1986.
1.

(See Addendum 2).

Ralph Tolman was hired from the Salt Lake County

Sheriff's Department as an investigator for the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office.
2.

(Transcript

P.641, L.21-25).

The responsibilities and duties of an investigator of

the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office were the same
responsibilities and duties as a law enforcement officer for the
State of Utah and required peace officer certification.
(Transcript P.750, L.23-25, P.751, L.l-16, P.641, L.16-22, i.e.,
Section 77-la-l(l)(a)(vi) U.C.A., 1953, as amended).
3.

On June 5, 1981, at 12:10 a.m., Tropper Terry

McKinnon, of the Utah Highway Patrol stopped a blue AMC Hornet
driven by Ralph Tolman.
4.

(Transcript P.77, L.l-20, P.78, L.22-24).

Mr. Tolman was driving a Salt Lake County Attorney

vehicle which had a police radio and he informed Trooper McKinnon
that he had a gun in the glove box.

(Transcript P.78, L2-4,

20-24, P.86, L.24-25).
5.

Trooper McKinnon smelled an odor of alcohol on

Tolman, determined that he was driving under the influence or
impaired and arrested him. (Transcript P.79, L.4-5, P.81, L.22-25,
P.82, L.2-4).
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6.

Mr. Tolman was transported to the Murray City P.D.

Department where a breathalizer test was administered.
(Transcript P.82, L.2-4, P.83, L.13-14, P.84, L.12-25).
7.

The results of the breathalyzer test showed a blood

alcohol level of .11%.
8.

(Transcript P.85, L.6).

Tolman was released to Sgt. Granes while Trooper

McKinnon was concerned with what to do with the County Attorney's
car. (Transcript P.85, L.9-10, P.86, L.24-25, P.87, L.l-4).
9.

Ralph Tolman entered a plea in the above matter to

Reckless Driving. (Transcript P.79 and 80).
10.

Don Sawaya, Chief Deputy of the Salt Lake County

Attorney's Office, verbally warned Mr. Tolman that any further
repetition would result in his termination.

(Transcript P.92,

L.15-21, P.93, L.l-10, L.16-24).
11.

As disciplinary action, Mr. Tolman was given five (5)

days off without pay, however he was allowed to forfeit five
compensatory days.

(Transcript P.95, P.292, L.4-24, P. 293,

L.l-7).
12.

Mr. Tolman did not challenge the fact that he had

been arrested for a D.U.I, by Trooper McKinnon and he admitted
that he had plead guilty to Reckless Driving.

(Transcript P. 661,

L.18-25, P.662, L.l-4).
13.

In 1983 or 1984, Mr. Tolman, was observed exiting the

Sage Lounge by Officers Tom Cowan and Sgt. Tim Start of the
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Midvale Police Department.

(Transcript P.Ill, L. 21-24, P.Ill,

L.12-20, P.744, L.6-7).
14.

Tolman staggered or walked very unsteadily to his car

and got in.

The officers observed him start his car and the brake

lights came on.

(Transcript P.112, L.7-21, P.112, L.23-25, P.744,

L.11-12 and L.24-25).
15.

Tolman7s vehicle was blocked by Sgt. Start.

Both

officers stated they smelled an odor of alcohol on Tolman and
concluded that he was under the influence of an intoxicant.
(Transcript P.113, L.21-25, P.114, L.3-10, P.119, L.6-7, P.745,
L.4-5, P.745, L22-25).

16.

Tolman was belligerent and irrate and did not want

the officers to find him an alternate way home.

(Transcript

P.114, L.18-24, P.129, L.7-12).
17.

Sgt. Start was reluctant to arrest Tolman because of

his position as a investigator for the Salt Lake County Attorney
Office. (Transcript P.122, L.2-4, P.744, L.13-18, P.746, L.17-18).

18.

Tolman did not contest that he was at the Sage Lounge

or that he had been drinking, but only challenged the officers'
version of whether or not he entered his vehicle and started it.
(Transcript P.688).
19.

The Salt Lake County Career Service Council chose not

to accept the version of Tolman and his ex-wife, Linda, but
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rather accepted the testimony of the officers as being more
credible.
20.

On August 18, 1986, at 17th South and 11th East,

Ralph Tolman was arrested for driving under the influence of
alcohol by Salt Lake City Police Officers Muniz and Hendenstrom.
(Transcript P.131, L.24-25, P.132, L.10-11, P.132, L.5-8, P.133,
L.25).
21.

Tolman identified himself with his driver's license

and his Salt Lake County Attorney identification card.
(Transcript P.134, L.10-11).
22.

His eyes were blood shot, he smelled of alcohol and

both officers were of the opinion that he was under the influence
of alcohol.

(Transcript P.134, L.22-24, P.140, L.21-24, P.154,

L.l-2).
23.

Officer Hendenstrom administered five field sobriety

tests, they were:
finger count;

(1) one leg stand;

(2) nine step walk;

(3)

(4) modify attention; and (5) eye gage test.

(Transcript P.151, P.152, P.153, L.16-18).

Hendenstrom asked

Tolman why he was trying to tell him where he was employed.
(Transcript P.154, L.19-20).

While being transported to the Salt

Lake County Jail, Tolman told Officer Hendenstrom that he would
probably lose his job.

(Transcript P.156, L.18-19).
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24.

Officer Hendenstrom administered the Intoxilizer

machine test to Tolman and received a result of .152%, which is
almost twice the legal limit. (Transcript P.157-58, P.159, L.8-14).
25.

The Salt Lake County Career Service Council found

that this incident occurred while Mr. Tolman was off-duty.
(Transcript P.132, L.4-18).
26.

Mr. Tolman admitted that he plead guilty to a

alcohol-related offense of reckless driving which arose from this
event.

(Transcript P.717, L.5-6).
27.

On June 10, 1986, in the evening hours, Ralph Tolman

went to the home of Margo Bergvall, with whom he had previously
lived. (Transcript P.692, L.14-20, P.173, L.13-17, P.174 and 175).
28.
of 1986.

Bergvall and Tolman's relationship had ended in May

(Transcript P.171, L.4-6).

29.

On June 10, Bergvall and a fellow co-worker, Dave

Nielsen had been to an office party at Aggies7 and had gone to
Bergvall's house.
30.

(Transcript P.173, L.13-24).

Both Bergvall and Nielsen got into her hot tub, and

... subsequently, Tolman found them in the hot tub and began
yelling obscentities.

(Transcript P.175, L.14-18, P.248, L.13-19,

P.696, L.2-8).
31.

Tolman grabbed Mr. Nielson by the testicles while

Bergvall and Nielsen fled into the house.
P.248, L.22-25, P.696, L2-8).
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(Transcript P.17 6,

32.
ensued.

(Transcript P.176).
33.

it.

Tolman forced his way into the house where a struggle

Tolman threw Bergvall into her glass table, breaking

(Transcript P.176, L.18-22, P.696, L.18-25).
34.

Tolman then grabbed Nielsen with a choke hold and

they struggled.
35.

(Transcript P.177, L.4-8, and L.16-18).

Tolman grabbed Bergvall again and threw her against

the refrigerator, causing her to hit her head.

(Transcript P.177,

L.4-8, P.251, L.l-10).
36.

Tolman then grabbed Nielsen in another choke hold and

tried to push him through the kitchen window.
broken and Tolman cut his arm.

The window was

(Transcript P.178, P.544, L2-9,

P.250, L.15-20).
37.

After things settled down, Tolman left and Bergvall

asked Nielsen to stay because she was frightened.

(Transcript

P.179, L.20-24, P.254, L.6-8).
38.

The next morning, June 11, 1986, at about 8:00 a.m.,

Ralph Tolman returned and entered the home of Margo Bergvall
uninvited.

He saw Dave Nielsen asleep on the couch and proceeded

to grab him by the testicles.

(Transcript P.180, L.7-25, P.254,

L.6-8, L.11-21, and P.545, L.15-16).
39.

Tolman told Nielsen that he was going to kill him and

then began to kick Nielsen in the head and chest.

(Transcript

P.180, L.18-25, P.254 L.17-21, P.255, L.21-25, P.545, L.22-24).
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40.

Tolman had been on his way to work on June 11, 1986,

when he stopped at Bergvall/s house, forcibly entered and
assaulted Dave Nielsen.
41.

(Transcript 700 L.2-4, P.180 and P.181).

Nielsen was allowed to dress while Tolman made more

threats on his life, and he left the residence.

(Transcript

P.256, L.15-16).
42.

Tolman subsequently left Bergvall's house and went to

his ex-wife's place of business and proceeded to tell her of the
events of that morning. (Transcript P.701, P.702).
43.

After spending the morning and the lunch hour with

his ex-wife, Linda Tolman, Tolman returned to work.

(Transcript

P.702).
44.

Additionally, there was no factual dispute that a

assault occurred at Margo Bergvall's residence on June 10 and
11th, as testified to by Tolman and his witnesses.

(Transcript

543, P.544, P.545, and P.696-701).
45.

In January of 1986, a meeting was called by Don

Harmon, Chief Agent of the Investigators of the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office, to discuss a change in policy regarding the
personal use of County Attorney vehicles.

(Transcript P.2 61,

L.17-24, P.262, L.3-7, P.261, L.17-25).
46.

The directive given to the investigators was that the

County Attorney vehicles assigned to them could only be used for
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offical business and not for personal use.

(Transcript P.263,

L.10-11, P.309, L.4-6, P.669, L.22-25).
47.

The vehicle assigned to Tolman was initially a

Chevrolet Citation but in the summer of 1986, he was assigned a
brown Chevrolet Celebrity.
48.

(Transcript P.265, L.6-14).

Harmon conducted checks on several Fridays and the

following Mondays of the mileage readings of investigators'
vehicles.

He determined that Tolman's vehicle was used for

personal use on the three occassions that he checked.

(Transcipt

P.295, L.15-19, L.22-25, P.296, L6-13, L.20-25, P.265, L.21-25,
and P.266, L.20-25).
49.

Harmon gave Tolman a written reprimand for disobeying

his directive.
50.

(Transcript P.268, L.3-13).

The private use of the County Attorney's vehicle by

Tolman was also shown by the testimony of Dave Nielsen, who stated
that on August 8, 1986, in the early morning hours, he saw Ralph
getting into his brown Chevrolet Celebrity after Nielsen was
leaving a party at Bergvall's. (Transcript P.257, L.9-15, P.259,
L.8-14).
51.

On October 8, 1985, Ralph Tolman and Jim Burns of the

Salt Lake County Attorney's office were going into the City and
County Building when they saw John Harrington of KTVX Television
station. (Transcript P.309, L.18-22, P.310, L.1-5, P.415, L.13-25,
P.678, L.12-25).
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52.

Tolman called Harrington "Yellow Hair", which was in

reference to a confrontation that Harrington had with Indians in
the Wind River area of the week before.

(Transcript P.312,

L.15-25, P.313, L.l-8, P.416, L.l-12, P.678, L.19-25).
53.
Harrington.
54.
Harrington.

A violent verbal exchange followed between Tolman and
(Transcript P.416, L.l-12).
Gross obscenities were used by both Tolman and
(Transcript P.317, L.10-12, P.418, L.14-15, P.678,

L.19-25).
55.

Harrington thought that Tolman had been drinking, and

that Tolman was going to physically strike him.

(Transcript

P.418, P.440, L.3-7).
56.

Harrington thought Tolman was going to hit him when

he had his hands in his pockets.
57.

(Transcript P.440, L.8-9).

Jim Burns grabbed Tolman and physically took him into

the building. (Transcript P.418, L.18-25).
58.

Sam Dawson, Ralph Tolman's immediate supervisor, was

requested by Bud Ellett, Chief Deputy of the Justice Division, to
go to KTVX and defuse the situation if possible.

(Transcript

P.309, L.18-22, P.311, L.14-16).
59.

The verbal confrontation between Harrington and

Tolman was observed by several newsmen, who were there to cover
the Ronnie Lee Gardner trial.

(Transcript P.470, L.6-9, P.310,

L.l-5, P.415, L.13-25).
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60,

Harrington filed criminal charges against Tolman with

the Salt Lake City Attorney's Office, but dropped them two weeks
later.

(Transcript P.419, L.l-3, P.423, L.l-10).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case involves the termination of the Appellant, Ralph

Tolman, from his position as a investigator for the Salt Lake
County Attorney's office.

As a investigator, the Appellant

performed many of the same duties as a peace officer of the State
of Utah and was required to be peace officer certified.
The Salt Lake County Attorney's office listed six
allegations of misconduct which it believed was sufficient to
sustain a termination.

The record reflects no dispute that the

six incidents occurred, the only contention of the Appellant is
that the Salt Lake County Career Service Council failed to see the
facts in the same light in which the Appellant believed them to
be.

This Court cannot substitute its judgment of what the facts

are but must defer to the findings of the Salt Lake County Career
Service Council.
The Appellant asserts that this Court's jurisdiction is
invoked by Section 63-46b-16 U.C.A.; however, this is incorrect
for this appeal comes to this Court as an appeal from a denial of
Appellant's petition for a Extraordinary Writ pursuant to rule
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65B(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The basis for

review under 65B is whether or not the Salt Lake County Career
Service Council abused its discretion or exceeded its
jurisdiction.

This statutory standard is then reviewed under the

tests enunciated in Department of Administrative Services v.
Public Service Commission, (see infra.).
The record of the hearing before the Salt Lake County
Career Service Council reflects that the Appellant was given his
due process rights and his assertion that the Career Service
Council failed to consider and rule on the issue of nexus is
erroneous.

Additionally, the admission of heresay testimony was

merely corroborative and not disputed by the Appellant.
The Appellant asks this Court to substitute its judgment
for that of the lower tribunal (Salt Lake County Career Service
Council) and mitigate the decision of the County Attorney's office
and that of the Career Service Council.

If this Court adopted his

argument, it would require a change from the Supreme Court's
decisions in Vetterli and the Discharge of Jones.

(See infra).

The record is documented with testimony of numerous
witnesses who substantiated the allegations of the County
Attorney's office that the Appellant, as a peace officer of the
State of Utah, is required to maintain his private life as example
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to all.

Therefore, Salt Lake County respectfully reguests that

this Court uphold the decision of the Salt Lake County Career
Service Council and that of Judge Noel.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THIS COURT'S JURISDICTION IS NOT
INVOKED PURSUANT TO SECTION
63-46b-16 U.C.A. AND THE STANDARD
OF REVIEW IS PRESCRIBED BY RULE
65B(b)(2) U.R.C.P.

The Appellant, in his brief to this Court, has cited
Section 63-46b-16, Utah Code Annotated, as the authority for which
he asks the Court to reverse the decision of the Career Service
Council and the District Court.

Section 63-46b-16(l) sets forth

the jurisdictional authority by which the Court of Appeals may
"review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings."

However, 63-46b-l et.seg.,

"The Administrative

Procedures Act," does not apply to Salt Lake County.

The

legislature specifically excluded political subdivisions of the
State of Utah from the definition of "Agency", i.e.,
63-46b-2(1)(b).

Salt Lake County is a political subdivision of

the State of Utah and, therefore, for Appellant to assert that
this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 63-46b-16 is erroneous and
any arguments that the standard of review falls under the
Administrative Procedure Act should be stricken.
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The Appellant's appeal contests the order of Judge Noel,
which denied his Petition for Extraordinary Relief.

The

Appellant's appeal of the Career Service Council was brought
pursuant to Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(See

attached Addendum 3).
The Appellant was terminated by the Salt Lake County
Attorney office pursuant to the policies adopted by Salt Lake
County through authority granted by the "County Personnel
Management Act".

(17-33-1. et.seq.)

This act provides for a

independent bipartisian council to hear all disciplinary actions,
including terminations, that are not resolved.

Section 17-33-4(1)

states in part that the decisions of the Career Service Council
are final and binding. "However, a right of appeal to the District
Court under the provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
shall not be abridged."

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

provides for an appeal through Rule 65B entitled "Extrordinary
Writs". 65B(b)(2) provides in part:
"Appropriate relief may be granted...where an
inferior tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction
or abused its discretion;"
Several Utah cases have held that the proper statutory
authority for review of similar cases is found under Rule
65B(b)(2) i.e., Child v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission,
575 P.2d 195 (Utah, 1978), Child petitioned the Court for a
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review of his discharge as a police officer pursuant to Rule
65B(b)(2); Lee v. Provo City Civil Service Commission, 582 P.2d
485 (Utah, 1978), Lee appealed his dismissal as a police officer
for a extramarital affair; In the Matter of the Discharge of Wayne
L. Jones, 720 P.2d 1356 (Utah, 1986), sheriff appealed the
decision of the merit commission and the District Court affirmance
thereof.
POINT A
THE COURT IS REQUIRED TO CONDUCT
ITS REVIEW BASED ON THE FACTS AS
SET OUT IN THE RECORD OF THE
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE LOWER
TRIBUNAL
The appeal of Ralph Tolman from the judgment of the
District Court, which acted as an appellate court, comes to this
Court for review as if it had come directly from the Salt Lake
Career Service Council.
supra.

In the matter of Wayne L. Jones, p.13 60

The Supreme Court has held in similar cases that the

nature and extent of a review of a lower tribunal's decision
depends on what happened in the tribunal below, as reflected by
its record.

Only under limited circumstances may the reviewing

court go beyond the record and take new evidence.

If, in fact,

there was no hearing below or no record was kept, the Court can
review the facts itself.

Where, however, the lower tribunal

conducted a recorded hearing, took evidence, heard sworn
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witnesses, or generally comported with due process requirements
and made its decision on facts derived from that hearing, a
reviewing Court is limited to the record of the lower tribunal.
Denver & Rio Grande v. Central Weber Sewer Imp. Dist., 287 P.2d
844 (Utah, 1955); Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake
City, 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah, 1984); and Davis County v. Clearfield
City, 756 P.2d 1278 (Utah, 1988).

For instance, in the Davis

County decision, the Court found that the city council had held a
"secret meeting" in which a record was not kept and the council's
decision was apparently made.

Further, the council's ruling

included no findings of fact nor reasons for its decision; under
these circumstances, the Court found that it was appropriate to
take evidence.

The Supreme Court has further held that District

Courts are limited to taking evidence under circumstances similar
to those at issue only when it is necessary to do so based on the
inadequacy of the record.

Otherwise Summary Judgment based on a

review of the record is the appropriate remedy.

Child, supra.

This procedure is set out in Rule 65B itself.
Subparagraph (e) as that Rule provides that where the Court
determines it is appropriate to issue a writ, "it shall be
directed to the inferior tribunal, board or officer, or to any
other person having custody of the record or proceedings,
commanding such tribunal, board or officer to certify fully to the
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Court issuing the writ within a specified time, a transcript of
the record and proceedings.•."
POINT B
THE COURT IS REQUIRED TO DEFER TO
THE JUDGMENT AND DISCRETION OF THE
LOWER TRIBUNAL.
It is an axiom of this type of review, regardless of
whether the District Court made its decision based on the record
or takes evidence beyond the record, that this Court is required
to defer to the judgment and discretion of the lower tribunal,
i.e., Salt Lake County Career Service Council.

The Davis County

case found that even where a District Court goes beyond the record
to take evidence, it is still mandated to determine the basis of
the lower tribunals decision and give deference to that decision
—

not to take evidence on the merits of the matter before the

lower tribunal and decide on its own what is the best decision on
the merits.

Where the lower tribunal conducted a hearing and

arrived at a decision, the reviewing court may not interfere with
the discretion of the lower tribunal. Peatross v. Board of
Commissioners of S.L. Co., 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976).
Further, a reviewing court is obligated, when it is
dealing with a lower tribunal which has specialized knowledge in a
particular field, such as a planning and zoning board or, as in
this case, the Career Service Council, to allow a comparatively
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wider latitude of discretion and a presumption of correctness of
the decision of that lower tribunal.

This Court under the facts

presented to the Salt Lake County Career Service Council should
not lightly interfere with that body's decision.

Xanthos, supra.

POINT C
THE COURT'S REVIEW IS LIMITED TO
WHETHER THE LOWER TRIBUNAL EXCEEDED
ITS JURISDICTION OR ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AND THE COURT MAY NOT
SUBSTITUTE ITS JUDGMENT ON THE
MERITS.
The Appellant, in his appeal brief, sets forth the
standard for review that was promulgated by the Supreme Court in
the Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service
Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983) and followed by this Court in
the case of Taylor v. Utah State Training School, 775 P.2d 432
(Ut. App. 1989).

However, the standard explained in these cases

does not overturn previous decisions concerning the standard of
review, but only clarifies them.

The continuum of review as

explained by Justice Oaks in Administrative Services is applied to
whether the Salt Lake County Career Service Council abused its
discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction.

Review is limited to the

guestion of abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction.

It is

not within the Court's prerogative to substitute its judgment if
the record discloses that there was a reasonable basis for the
decision below.

Xanthos, supra,.

Rule 65B(b)(2) has, itself,
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clarified the standard of review in such cases holding that review
does not extend to the merits of the decision, but solely to
whether the inferior tribunal, Salt Lake Career Service Council,
abused its discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction.
"Abuse of discretion" is not an undefined standard;
rather, it refers to acting arbitrarily or without a basis in
reason and the Findings of Fact will only be upset where they are
so without foundation they must be deemed capricious and
arbitrary.

Utah Dept. of Admin. Services, p.608.

For instance, a

lower tribunal's refusal to provide written findings of fact may
suggest that there is no rational basis for its decision and thus
its decision may well have been arrived at arbitrarily.
County, supra.

Davis

Minor irregularities in the decision process are

not by themselves sufficient to constitute arbitrariness or acting
without a basis in reason.

Absent such arbitrariness or lack of

factual basis, the reviewing court cannot disturb the lower
tribunal's findings.

Erkman v. Civil Service Commission of Provo

City, 198 P.2d 238 (Utah, 1948).
II
THE HEARING BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE
COUNCIL DID NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS
The Appellant asserts in his appeal that he was not given a
fair hearing for the reason that the Career Service Council allowed
Sam Dawson to relate

Dave Nielson's testimony, that the Council
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failed to rule that evidence of off-duty conduct could not be
presented, and that there was prejudice because a deputy Salt Lake
County Sheriff was present throughout the hearing.

There is

nothing in the record submitted to this Court that demonstrates an
unfair hearing.

"Due process entitles an individual in an

administrative proceeding to a fair hearing before an impartial
tribunal..."

However, "a substantial showing of personal bias is

required to disqualify a hearing officer or obtain a ruling that a
hearing is unfair."

Roach v. National Transportation Safety Board,

804 F.2d 1147, 1160 (10th Cir. 1986).

The minimum level of due

process required at an administrative hearing does not rise to the
same standards set for litigation in a court.

"It is well settled

under federal and state law that due process consideration does not
require the full array of procedural tools available to a plaintiff
in a administrative hearing."

Damino v. O'Neill, 702 F.Supp.

949,953 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); e.g., Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); Powell v.
Mikulecky, 891 F.2d 1454 (10th Cir. 1989).

The Supreme Court of

Utah has also spoken to the difference between administrative
hearings and trials.

In the case of Wilson v. Industrial

Commission of Utah, 735 P.2d 403 (Utah, 1987); the Court stated:
"this Court has long recognized that there are significant
differences between court trials and proceedings before
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administrative agencies and that the technical rules of evidence
need not be applied before the latter." e.g., Erkman, Supra.
The procedures that ensure a fair hearing under the Due
Process Clause are as follows:

(1) prior notice of the charges

(the Appellant was given the notice of intent to terminate on
September 8th of 1986, which set forth the specific allegations,
see Addendum 1); (2) a hearing before an impartial panel (hearing
commenced on November 3rd of 1986, and required almost one month to
complete and the record is filled with rulings where the Council
stated it wanted to hear all the evidence, Transcript p.33,
L.13-18, and it allowed each side to present its evidence); (3)
representation by legal counsel (Appellants' present counsel
represented him in the hearing before the Career Service Council);
(4) cross-examination of the witnesses (the record speaks for
itself); (5) to present evidence in his own behalf. (The record
speaks for itself); and (6) Appellant's right to inspect
documentary evidence against him (the record speaks for itself).
Sheehan v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners of Pes Plaines, 509
N.E. 2d 467 (111. App. 1987).
In reference to Appellant's allegation of improper use of
hearsay testimony presented by Investigator Sam Dawson, he fails to
point out that the County Attorney's office presented the following
facts to the Career Service Council:
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(1) Margo Bergvall was called

upon and testified of the events of June 10, and June 11, 1986,
regarding the Appellant, herself and Dave Nielsen; (2) that Dave
Nielsen was identified as a witness by the County Attorney's
Office; (3) that he was served a subpoena by County Attorney's
office to appear before the Career Service Council on a date
certain; (4) that he was contacted by telephone on the date of his
appearance and informed the County Attorney's office that he would
not appear; (5) that Sam Dawson interviewed Dave Nielsen on October
29, 1986 and testified concerning that conversation; and (6) that
the testimony of Dave Nielsen corroborated the testimony already
given by Margo Bergvall.
L.10-15).

(Transcript P.239, L.8-17, P.241, P.244,

Additionally, there was no evidence presented at the

hearing that the Appellant himself sought to subpoena Mr. Nielsen.
The Career Service Council made a rational decision regarding the
admission of Sam Dawson's testimony based upon the facts before
it.

(Transcript P.244, L.14-24).

Additionally, the Career Service

Council was aware of Salt Lake County Policy 5710, 7.0, which
states that hearings will not be bound by legal procedures nor
legal rules rules of evidence, and United States v. Lumkin, 767
F.2d 1182 (1982) which allowed the use of hearsay testimony in a
murder trial. (Transcript P.234).
There is no case in Utah which states that hearsay is not
admissible in an administrative hearing.
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In Wilson, cited supra,

the Supreme Court of Utah stated: "Hearsay evidence is admissible
in proceedings before administrative agencies.

However, findings

of fact cannot be based exclusively on hearsay evidence."

p.404

The finding of fact #6 was not based exclusively upon the hearsay
testimony of Dave Nielsen and therefore no due process rights of
the Appellant were violated.
The Appellant has alleged that the Career Service Council's
decision to allow an armed deputy sheriff to be present throughout
the hearing had a prejudical effect upon the Council, and
therefore, the Appellant was denied due process.

As set forth

previously, a administrative hearing is not required to comport
with the same procedural safeguards as that of a trial. However,
even in a criminal setting, the presence of an armed guard at a
trial in front of a jury has been held not to violate the
defendant's due process rights. Hardee v. Kuhlman, 581 F.2d 330
(2nd. Cir. 1978) Compelling a defendant to appear before a jury
wearing handcuffs and leg irons held not to be a denial of due
process. Marquez v. State, 725 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Cr. App. 1987).
There is nothing in the record which would point to how the
Appellant was prejudiced by the presence of a deputy sheriff, and
therefore respondent submits that Appellant's due process rights
were not violated.
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Ill
THE CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL DID NOT
COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR AND DID RULE
ON THE ISSUE OF OFF-DUTY CONDUCT AND
ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE COUNTY
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE,
In the pre-hearing conference before the Career Service
Council, the Appellant asked the Council to rule that any evidence
of off-duty conduct not be heard or used as a basis for
termination.

The Appellant alleges that the Council failed to

make a ruling upon the issue of "nexus" between the employment and
the off-duty actions of the Appellant.
true.

This is not accurate or

The chairman of the Career Service Council stated:

"First

of all, I'd like to explain that we view this hearing really as a
fact finding, information gathering hearing.

And that Council

members, ... have a great responsibility to listen to the evidence
and weigh the evidence and give the value to it that should be
given.

And this isn't a legal hearing where we have narrow rules

of evidence and we want to hear information that has relevant
value, probative value and substantive value.

So we feel that

actually these motions [to limit evidence regarding off-duty
conduct] have too much of a narrowing effect on the hearing."
(Transcript P.33, L.9-20).

Counsel for the Appellant then asked

to strike the allegations of the assault and battery on Margo
Bervall, because it occurred on off-duty time and it was
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scandalous.

(Transcript P.45, L.12-22).

Subsequently, Counsel

withdrew his motion for the reasons that he believed supporting
documents had been submitted to the Council prior to the hearing.
He stated:

"I'll withdraw the motion, I'd assumed you had been

given the same documents... that we had." (Transcript P.47,
L.11-13).
that."

He then states:

"Fine. Okay, then I'll withdraw

(Transcript P.47, L.20-21).
The Appellant fails to understand that off-duty conduct of

a law enforcement officer is relevant to his employment because he
is held to a higher standard of conduct than the average citizen.
In fact, off-duty conduct alone may be sufficient to justify the
termination of one's employment, particularly when that person
occupies the position of a law enforcement officer for the State
of Utah.

The Supreme Court of Utah has upheld the termination of

police officers for off-duty conduct in the following:

Child v.

Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission, 575 P.2d 195 (Utah,
1978), off-duty altercation at a bar which resulted in the death
of a citizen.

Hutchinson v. Cartwright, 692 P.2d 772 (Utah, 1984)

a jailor's conduct at a deposition resulted in termination.

Lee

v. Provo City Civil Service Commission, 582 P.2d 485 (Utah, 1978),
Provo City Police Officer terminated for extra-marital
relationship with a female dispatcher, e.g., In the Matter of the
Discharge of Wayne L. Jones, 720 P.2d 1356 (Utah, 1986), Sheriff
deputy's purchase under duress of jail inmate's property.
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Courts throughout the United States recognize that
off-duty conduct of a police officer may be grounds for
termination.

In the case of Philadelphia Civil Service Commission

v. Wojtusik, 525 A.2d 1255 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987), the termination of
an off-duty police officer was upheld because he struck a police
officer who was attempting to place him under arrest.

In Whitmore

v. Civil Service Merit Board of Shelby, 673 S.W.2d 535
(Tenn.1984), a police officer was terminated for theft of
electricity from his residence.

Respondents assert that

Appellant7s argument that there is no nexus between his employment
and his off-duty conduct is not well taken and the Court should
rule that the Career Service Council acted with reason.
IV
THE CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL
DECISION TO UPHOLD THE TERMINATION
OF THE PETITIONER SHOULD BE UPHELD
The Appellant argues that if the Court finds an "adequate
showing of justification for the imposition of a penalty in this
case, it is reasonable for the court to conclude that the penalty
of termination should be mitigated downward substantially."
assertion misstates the law on all counts.

The

The correct test to be

applied is found in Vetterli v. Civil Service Commision of Salt
Lake City, 145 P.2d 792 (Utah, 1944) and quoted in the case of the
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Discharge of Wayne L. Jones, cited supra.

The Supreme Court of

Utah stated that a Civil Service Commission's authority on review
of the disciplinary action involves an inquiry as to whether (1)
the facts support the charges made by the department head, and if
so, (2) whether the charges warrant the sanction imposed.

The

Court in Jones stated "The second Vetterli inquiry, whether the
charges warrant the sanction imposed, is a limited one.

The

sheriff must manage and direct his deputies, and [he] is in the
best position to know whether their actions merit discipline.

If

the Merit Commission finds upon review that the facts support the
charges against the deputy, then it must affirm the sheriff's
disciplinary action, unless it finds the sanction so clearly
disproportionate to the charges as to amount to an abuse of the
sheriff's discretion."

(P.1363).

Likewise, the County Attorney

is in the best position to know whether the action of an
investigator merits discipline and unless the termination is so
clearly disproportionate to the charges that it amounts to an
abuse of discretion, this Court must uphold the decision.
Appellant in his brief refers to a Confidential Memorandum that it
was the opinion of the Counsel for the County Attorney's office
that a termination would not be sustainable.

The reference to a

attorney work product that was confidential is absolutely
irrelevant.

Counsel who prepared the memo did not hold a position
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of authority to even recommend disciplinary action and said
confidential memorandum was prepared prior to interviews with
Margo Bergvall and Dave Nielsen.

(See attached Objection to

Petitioner's Motion For Leave to Submit New Evidence and
accompanying affidavits marked as Addendum 4 ) .
A police officer must hold himself to a higher standard of
conduct than the average citizen.

This higher standard was

recognized in the case of the Discharge of Jones.

The Supreme

Court quoted from The Law Enforcement Code of Ethics for police
officers and stated, " The (Code) states, among other things, that
a police officer will...keep my private life unsullied as an
example to all" and "honest in thought and deed in both my
personal and offical life, I will be exemplary in obeying the laws
of the land...11

(P.1361, 1362).

Evidence was also presented to

the Career Service Council concerning this higher standard.

All

law enforcement personal called to testify recognized this higher
standard including the Appellant.
P.731, L.5-8).

(Transcript P.730, L.21-25,

Investigator Mike George, who worked with the

Appellant at the Sheriffs Office and at the County Attorney's
Office testified that: "We have a higher responsibility.
Everything that we do as investigators is scrutinized by the
courts.

If you will, we are contained within a fishbowl....so we

have to maintain ourselves to a higher standard.
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It comes with

our duty as police officers and representatives of the people of
Salt Lake County."

(Transcript P.759, L.5-10).

Mike George was

asked whether Ralph Tolman had brought unwarranted attention to
the office of the County Attorney.

He stated that he had

constantly in the last six months.

(Transcript P.759, L.21-25,

P.760, L.l-3).
Ralph Tolman's conduct either off-duty of driving under
the influence of alcohol, assaulting Ms. Bergvall and Mr. Nielsen,
or his heated verbal exchange with John Harrington cannot be
condoned by any law enforcement organization and therefore
Respondents assert that Appellant's sanction should not be
mitigated.
V
PRIOR CONDUCT OF THE APPELLANT MAY BE
USED IN PRESCRIBING THE SANCTION TO
BE IMPOSED.
The Appellant asserts that the County Attorney's office
has used prior offenses where he had been previously disciplined
prior to this action to terminate the Appellant.

Respondents

reply that of the six allegations, he was disciplined on only two,
i.e., D.U.I, arrest of June 5, 1981, and a letter of reprimand for
disobeying the directive to not use the County car for personal
use.

There is no single action upon which the Appellant was

terminated, but several allegations of severe misconduct that were
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public service.

The Appellant asserts that the Respondents have

violated the concept of Double Jeopardy by including the prior
disciplinary actions and he cites several cases in from Illinois.
However, a recent Illinois case allowed the use of prior
disciplinary action in consideration of the sanction that was
imposed.

In the case of Price v. Board of Fire and Police

Commissioners, 487 N.E.2d 673 (Ill.App.4 Dist. 1985), the Court
stated in regards to the interpretation of a personnel statute:
"Prohibition against double jeopardy is applicable only to
criminal proceedings, and public employee disciplinary proceedings
are civil in nature." (P.676).

An employee's past record in a

disciplinary proceeding cannot be utilized to prove a present
charge, but it may be used to provide guidance to determining the
appropriate penalty for the current offense.

In the Matter of

Wenderwicz, 478 A.2d 429 (N.J.Super.A.D.1984).
CONCLUSION
The Salt Lake County Career Service Council held a hearing
concerning allegations of misconduct by the Appellant.

The

Appellant was given notice of the charges, he was allowed to go
through his file at the County Attorney's office and a copies of
all documents were made and given to him, (Transcript P.13,
L.21-25, P.14, L.l-2).

He was represented by counsel.

He had the

opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and review the documents,
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and he had a fair hearing.

The Appellant now comes before this

Court and asks the Court to substitute its judgment for that of
the Career Service Council.

He asks this Court to believe his

version of the facts, and he asks this Court to set aside the
decision to uphold the termination.

The Appellant also attacks

the Findings of Fact as being "sketchy" and of no value.

Findings

of Fact may be general so long as they satisfy the dual
requirements of making intelligent court review possible, and
apprising the parties of the basis of the action taken.

McQuillin

Mun. Corp. Section 45.86 (3rd Ed).
The correct review standard to be applied is set forth in
Vetterli, to-wit:

do the facts support the allegations, and if

so, do the charges warrant the sanctions imposed.

The review of

the Career Service Council decision is a limited one.

To allow

otherwise would invite this Court to substitute its judgment on
the merits for that of the inferior tribunal.
Council).

(Career Service

This, a reviewing Court should not and cannot do. The

Court may disturb the findings of the inferior tribunal only where
those findings are not supported by the evidence.
City, cited supra.
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Lee v. Provo

WHEREFORE, Respondents ask this Court to rule that the
Salt Lake County Career Service Council did not exceed its
jurisdiction or abuse its discretion and that the Court dismiss
appellant's appeal.

DATED this

0?*
""

day of Uu^uJt,

1990.

DAVID E. YOCOM

Salt Lake County Attorney

*±

^

Vi Grf CAMPBELL'
Jeputy ^County A t t o r n e y
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11.

ADDENDUM

Notice of intent to terminate.
Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and Decision.
Summons and Petition For Extraordinary Relief.
Objection to Petitioner's Motion For Leave to Submit
New Evidence.
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©ffxrs xrf the ^ a l i Take Camttu Attorn** / J ^ 2 % .
T.L. "TED" CANNON

Iff

County Attorney

1«\

^^^£<A$\

(7?i\l2:j<if|

/-fj

M I C H A E L N. M A R T I N E Z
Cltwt Deputy County Attorney

September 8, 1986

Ralph Tolman
Salt Lake County Attorney's
Office
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
SUBJECT:

Notice of intent to terminate.

Dear Ralph:
This letter is to inform you .that pursuant to Sections
17-33-5(3)(p) 1733-7(2)(e) and 17-33-10, U.C.A.
(1953 as
amended} and Salt Lake County Policy 5715, I am texminating
your employment with the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office
effective September 19. 1986. Your last working day at the
office will be September 19, 1986.
This decision-is based upon your continuing misconduct
and acts inimical to public service; i.e., your D.U.I. -arrests
and other incidences which reflect poorly upon this office,
tarnishes the image thereof, and you have failed to obey
reasonable
orders of your supervisor.
Because of your
inappropriate behavior, this office is left with no alternative
but to terminate your employment.
Additionally, your acts
reflect an emotional instability which not only present a
danger to the citizens of Salt Lake County but places your
status of a police officer in jeopardy.
The specific incidences on which this office relies
are as follows:
1. On June 5, 1981, you were arrested by the Utah
Highway Patrol for driving under the influence of alcohol. You
subsequently pled guilty to a lesser included offense of
reckless driving. You were verbally warned and given five days
suspension by Don Sawaya. Chief Deputy of the Recovery
Division, with the admonishment that any further acts of this

231 East 4th South
Administration
^oger A. Livingston
3hief Oeouty County Attorney
jjzc Administrative Affairs
Mn Floor

D County Attorney Victim Services
Julie Brancn
Director
4tn Floor

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
D Justice Division
Waiter fl. Ellett
Chief Deouty
3rd Floor

(801) 363-7900

Q Investigative Agency
Don Harman
Soecial Agent in Charge
4th Floor

O Civil Division
William R. Hyde
Chief Deputy
2nd Floor

D Governmental Service:
Donald Sawaya
Chief Oeouty
2nd Floor

Ralph Tolman
September 8, 1986
Page 2
nature would result in your terminationof D.U.I, charges marlced as Attachment 1).

(See attached memos

2. In 1984 you were apprehended by the Midvale Police
after you and your wife left the Sage Lounge. Sergeant Tim
Short of the Midvale Police Department determined that you were
too 'intoxicated to drive. Because of your position with this
office, you were not arrested but allowed the opportunity to
find another way home.
3. On August 18 of this year, you were arrested by a
Salt Lake City police officer for running a red light and
Driving under the Influence. Your breathalizer test showed a
.15 percent alcohol content.
(See attached copies of police
report marlced as Attachment 2).
Certainly three D.U.I,
offenses within six years demonstrates poor judgment by a
police officer who is sworn to obey the law.
4. On June 10, 1986, you assaulted and battered Margo
Bergwall.
This of.fice recognizes that relationships develop
between adults, but your .actions in regards to Ms. Bergwall
demonstrate ..an inability .to control your emotions. Clearly
this office cannot tolerate your intimidations and threats made
to Ms. Bergwall and her acquaintances.
5.
In a nemo .of January 1986, you and the other
investigators were directed that County Attorney vehicles were
not to be used for personal use or on the weekends. Your
obvious disobedience of this directive has- been documented by
Don Harmon, who checked your mileage on two different
occasions. Furthermore, you were observed on August 9, 1986 at
Ms. Bergwall^ residence in a County Attorney's Office
vehicle. (See attached memos dated February 5, 1986 from Lt.
Sam Dawson, and memo dated February 4, 1986 marked as
Attachment 3).
6. Your confrontation with John Harrington on October
8, 1985 again demonstrates poor judgment by an investigator of
this office. (See attached memo marked as Attachment 4).
7. In September of 1982, you lied to your immediate
supervisor concerning the transportation of a witness. Clearly
this office must trust its employees to be truthful and this
applies even more to one who is a sworn peace officer. (See
attached memos marked as Attachment 5).
It is for the above stated reasons that it is this
office's decision to terminate your employment. You have the
right
to have a pretermination hearing to present any
mitigating factor in your favor. Said hearing will be held 10
o'clock Friday, September 12, 1986. In the event that your

Ralph Tolman
September
8 • 1986
Page 3
explanations
do
not
mitigate
the above
charges, your
termination will be effective on the date first above written.
Please find attached a copy of Salt Lake County Policy
5705, entitled Grievance Procedure. -This action will be heard
at thje department review level.
Sincerely,
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY

*

(0923J)

T. L. "Ted" Cannon

BEFORE THE SALT LAKE COUNTY

ilC'jSl*

CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL

DEC 2-'
COUMTY A
n\\t\\

IN RE:

Appeal of
RALPH TOLMAN

:
:
:

Case No. 8&-15
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Campbell,

The Salt
Sawava, as

Deouty Countv

Testimony was given, facts were adduced, exhibits were

receivea, and

otherwise being

fully aoorised in the matter, the

Council nereoy enters its Finomas of

Fact, Conclusions

of Law,

and Decision.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Aopeliant.

gator for tne Salt Lake

Ralnh To 1 man.
County

was hirea as ar\ Investi-

Attomev* s

Orfice

on

Ann-. 1.

1980.
S.

That the responsibilities ana auties of an Invest i cator

were the same responsibilities
officer m

the State

ana duties

as a

law enforcement

of Utan and tnat the position of Salt LaKe

County Investigator reauirea peace officer certification.

-23.

That on

tne early morning hours of June 5, 1981, Raich

Tolrnan. who was not on duty with tne Salt Lake

County Attorney's

Office, was arrested bv tne Lit an Highway Patrol for driving under
the influence of alcohol.
Lake County
glove box.

Mr. Tolrnan

Attorney's Office

had

been

vehicle and

Mr. Tolrnan was verbally

driving

a Salt

had a firearm in the

warned

and

aiven

five days

susoension DV tne Salt Lake County Attorney's Office after he had
olead guilty to a lessor offense of reckless driving.
4.

In 1983

or

Officers

of

the

Lounge.

One

of

Mr. Tolrnan

1984,

Ralon

Midvale
the

stagger

Tolrnan

Police

officers

towards

a

was

observed

Deoartrnent
testified

vehicle,

exiting
tnat

bv two
the Sage

he

observed

enter the vehicle, and

start its engine, whereupon they blocked the vehicle from leaving
the

area.

The

other

officer testified that he saw Mr. Tolrnan

exit tne Lounge and that he saw the brake lights

of Mr. Tolrnan's

vehicle.
This Council believes tne Of f icer .= version of the events at
the Sage Lounge when they
behind
This

tne

wneei

Council

Mr. Tolrnan was

of

further
in fact

indicated

tne

Raioh

Tolrnan

was

in fact

vehicle and was attemotmo to leave.

believes

tne

Officer's

version

that

intoxicated from alconol and that haa he

not Qfseri ar\ Investigator for Salt LaK.e County, he would nave b&en
arrested by tne Officers of Midvale.
5.

On August 18, 1986, Mr. Tolrnan was arrested for driving

under the influence of
11th

East.

His

blood

alcohol at
alcohol

aooroximateiv l7th
level

admitted tnat he had olead guilty to an

was

. l5£.

Soutn and
Mr. Tolrnan

alcohol-related reckless

-3-

drivmg

offense.

This

Council

notes tnat on ftuqust IS, 1966,

RalDh To1man was not on duty nor was he on

duty in

the incident

at the Sage Lounge in Midvale.
6.

In regards

to the

alienations of

Council finds that Raloh Tolman did

June 10, 1986, this

assault and

batter a female

acquaintance and her male friend at her home while Mr. Tolman was
off duty.
Tolman

However, on the day

was

on

duty,

he

battered her male friend.
on

his

way

Attorney's

to

work

vehicle

home.

The

Council

Mr. Tolman used

June

on

June
he

while Raloh

and assaulted and

home

Raloh Tolman was

11, 1986, in a Salt Laxe County

stopped

that

Door judgment

1986,

were that

his

at aoDroxirnately
finds

11,

ner^

entered
The facts

when

acauamtance* s house

of

in

car

at

ana that

female

arid enterea the

8:00 a. m
regards

the

to

this incident.

nis actions const ltuteci

acts inimical to DUD lie service.
7.
igators

In January of 1986, Ralpn Tolman and the
were

personal use.

instructed

not

to

other Invest-

use their County vehicles for

The facts were that Raloh Tolman

used his vehicle

on three separate occasions for his own personal use aria this was
m

violation of a direct order from a supervisor, a

msuDordination.

Nothing

was

clear act of

presented Dy the Appellant which

would mitigate his actions for disobevina a direct order.
8.
very poor

The Council

behavior when

local news reporter on
was the

further

finds

he launched
October 8,

that

Mr. Tolman exhibited

a verbal

1985.

attack acainst a

Clearly.

instigator of a very heated argument.

that the location of the incident comoined with

Ralph Tolman

The Council finds
the fact

that a

-4-

well-known

trial

was

strates not only a
acts

that

would

lack of
bring

Attorney's Office.
as

a

law

being

and

officer.

to the County

lack of professionalism

The

news reporter

but also constitutes

disfavor

The actions showed a

enforcement

duty and

good judgment,

discredit

incident with the local
was on

held in tne close proximity demon-

Council

notes

that tne

occurred while Mr. Tolrnan

that the evidence was clear that Mr. Tolrnan had

not been drinking, thus, alcohol was not a contributing factor in
the Appellant's behavior.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This Council, will apply the law of the State of Utah as set
forth in Vetterli_y. Cwj,i_Seryice_C^
145 P.£d

79£ (1945).

This Council believes that tne Respondent.

Salt Lake

County Attorney's

ments

Vetterl.i.

of

Tolrnan by the Salt

in

the facts

the

taken,

warranted.

It

that

the

is this

citizen

(1)

satisfied the reauire-

tne allegations against Ralph

Attorney1 s Office

termination

of

and that

police officer

Ralph

Tolrnan,

was

Council's opinion -chat a law enforcement
standard of

responsibility than tne

the higher standard of duty is evident

in tne Law Enforcement Code of Etnics wherein
that a

were not only

but that they ";ere not controverted; (£)

officer is held to a hiaher
average

Office, has

Lake County

supported by
action

yi!i§?_City,

will keep

ari example to all and that

he will

his private

it states

in part

life unsullied as

be exemplary

in obeying the

laws of the land.
This

Council

believes

that

tne

actions by Mr. Tolrnan in

regards to the assault incident and tne veroal confrontation with

-5-

the news

reporter, in

very ooor judgment Dy

adaition to

the DUI arrests, demonstrate

Raloh To1man

and brines

discredit to and

tarnishes tne image of the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office.
The

totality

of

the

allegations

demonstrated a pattern of conduct wnich
the

Salt

Lake

County

Attorney's

not alone

His

service.

be sufficient

but combined together, they

present a

Ralph

Tolman

meritea termination from

Office.

constitute acts inimical to tne public
individually may

against

actions

aid

Each alienation

to merit termination,

pattern of

misconduct bv

the Appellant which warrants the action taken.
The

relationship

between

the

off-duty

conduct

and

Mr. Tolman's position as a Salt Lake County Attorney Investigator
was

clear.

Certainly,

a

police

officer or County Attorney's

Investigator has a higher duty to obey tne laws than
average

citizen.

When

off-duty

attention of the public which
service or

in this

conduct

casts

a

is

poor

that of the

brought
image

to

the

upon public

case the Salt Lane Countv Attorney's Office,

the agency is justified in tne termination action.
This Council is not persuaaed nor
support the

contentions of

do we

find any

facts to

the Appellant that he was terminated

as a result of his political supoort of a local candidate or tnat
his actions
No

facts

should De
were

excused oecause

presented

to

show

he had consumed alcohol.

that

Ralpn

Tolman

was an

alcoholIC
In

fact,

the

Council

concludes

tnat

alcohol

is

contributing factor to Mr. Tolman's unprofessional conduct.
conclusion

is

based

upon

not a
This

comparing the incident of tne verbal

-6-

exchange

Detween

Mr. Tolrnan

with

tne

news reoorter wnere the

Appellant had not been drinking to the incidents
acquaintance

wnere

he

had

been

with the female

drinkina, demonstrate lack of

judgment and conduct unbecoming a police officer.
DECISION
This

Council,

therefore,

Resoondent's alienations

unanimously

are suooortable

finds

bv tne

that

the

facts and that

the sanctions imoosed-of termination were warrantea.
Dated

tmsji

KJL

day of De

SHERRI R. BUYQN/Cha<ir

~4 (Ar^

R0BERf^irTa^Ss7Membe™* T p ^"
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hpredy certify that I nave mailed a true and exact cooy of
the foregoing Finaings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision
to Zane Sill, counsel for Appellant: Jerry CamDOeli, counsel for
Department, SLYIO J. D. Johnson, Director of tne County Human
Resources Division, this » ^
day of December, 1966.

-y
ATES/ Coordinator

Kg£SafeE~

DATE

UPON .,<feV%^ 6

SINB^OEPUTY CONSTABLE

L. Zane Gill (3716) of
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
Attorneys for Petitioner
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 328-1666

ft-rVf

—•

Sa. COUNTS UTAH

/^y/^7^
/

PE^

Cc

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OFNET
° ' -^H

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RALPH TOLMAN,
Petitioner,

SUMMONS

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY CAREER SERVICECOUNCIL and SALT LAKE COUNTY
ATTORNEY,
Respondents.

Civil

No.

THE STATE OF UTAH TO. THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT SALT LAKE COUNTY CAREER
SERVICE COUNCIL:
You a r e h e r e b y summoned.and r e q u i r e d t o s e r v e upon o r mail

to

Plaintiff's attorney at 50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor, Salt Lake C i t y ,
Utah 84101, an answer in writing to the Petition for Extraordinary Relief
and f i l e a copy of said answer with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court
within Twenty (20) days after service of this Summons upon you. I f you
f a i l to so do, Judgment by Default will be taken against you for the r e l i e f
demanded in said P e t i t i o n , which has been f i l e d with the Clerk of the
Court, and a copy of which is hereto annexed and herewith served upon you.
DATED this 2J_ day of January 1988.
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH

A
L\Zane Gill
^ _
Attorneys for Petitioner

Defendant's Address:
Salt Lake County Career Service Council
2001 South State Street

L. Zane Gill of
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
Attorneys for Petitioner
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-1666
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

RALPH TOLMAN,

]
1
1

Petitioner,

PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY
RELIEF

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY CAREER SERVICE
COUNCIL, and SALT LAKE COUNTY
ATTORNEY,
Respondents.

]i

Civil No.

)
i

Judge

Petitioner, Ralph Rolman, by and through his counsel of record, L.
Zane Gill of Biele, Has 1am & Hatch, brings this action pursuant to Rule
65B(b)2 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The jurisdiction of this
Court is sought on the basis that the Salt Lake County Career Service
Counsel, an inferior tribunal, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded
its jurisdiction and/or abused its discretion.
PARTIES
1. The petitioner Ralph Tolman is an individual residing at all
relevant times in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

2.

The respondent Salt Lake County Career Service Council is an

agency of Salt Lake County government whose function i t 1s to hear administ r a t i v e appeals of employment grievance matters within Salt Lake County
government.

At the time relevant to. this matter, the members of the Salt

Lake County Career Service Council were Robert Adams, Sherry Guyon and
Willard Homer.

The Salt Lake County Career Service Council is named as an

e n t i t y and the individuals comprising.the council are not named individually.
3.

Respondent Salt Lake bounty Attorney is the elected county

official responsible-for the operations of the Salt Lake County A t t o r n e y ^
office", the former employer of petitioner Ralph Tolman.
BASIS OF THIS ACTION
1.

Petitioner Ralpfr TolmaTf was hired by the Salt Lake County

Attorney's office on A p r i l : 1 , 1980 after having served as a Salt Lake
County Deputy Sheriff for several years*
2.- The Salt Lake County -Attorney's office, through its elected
County Attorney, Ted L. Cannon, instituted termination proceedings against
petitioner allegedly based upon conduct violative of the law enforcement
code of ethics.

The charges against petitioner were set forth i n a notice

of intent to terminate dated September 8, 1986. A copy of that document i s
attached hereto as Exhibit A.
3.

Preliminary hearings and a grievance hearing were held in this

matter before the Salt Lake County Career Service Council i n October and
November 1986.
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4.

A final

decision of the Salt Lake County Career Service

Council was rendered on December 3, 1986.

A copy of the findings of f a c t ,

conclusions of law and decision is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
5.

On December 23, 1986, petitioner f i l e d a notice of appeal with

the c l e r k ' s o f f i c e of Salt Lake County with the intent of commencing an
appeal of the final order of the Salt take County Career Service Council
pursuant to Rule 73(h) of the Utah Rul.es of C i v i l Procedure.
f i l e was opened in that matter, case no. C-86-9430.

A case

In that a c t i o n , Ralph

Tolman sought a review of the final administrative order of the Salt Lake
County Career Service Council and named as respondent Salt Lake County
Attorney's office.
6.

On December 2, 1987, the Salt Lake County Attorney's office

made a motion to dismiss the petitioner's appeal in case no. C-86-9430.

A

hearing was held on that motion on Friday, January 8, 1988, before the
Honorable Judge Moffat.

Petitioner's appeal was dismissed without p r e j u -

dice.
7.

In the process of preparing his appeal in the action which has

now been dismissed, petitioner obtained the tape recorded record of the
hearings held before the Salt Lake County Career Service Council.

Peti-

tioner's counsel attempted to make a written transcript from those tape
recordings; however, the quality of the tape recording was so poor that the
transcript has l i t t l e value as a reference document.
8.

The Career Service Council committed reversible error by

failing to rule before the evidentiary hearing on p e t i t i o n e r ' s motion
regarding "nexus."
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9.

The Career Service Council committed r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r by

f a i l i n g to consider i t s legal obligation to mitigate penalties.
10.

The Career Service Council committed r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r by

f a l l i n g t o rule that the County A t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e may not impose double
jeopardy for events which are the subject of former d i s c i p l i n e .
11.

The Career Service'Council committed r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r by

conducting the hearing in such a manner as to deprive the petitioner of his
-employment -without-^tie-ppocess of law-*
12.

The Career Service Council committed r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r by

allowing key portions of the testimony against p e t i t i o n e r t o be entered
i n t o the record through hearsay and then basing i t s ultimate decision upon
the events to which the hearsay related.

WHEREFORE, petitioner requests
1.

That a w r i t iVsife d i r e c t i n g the Salt Lake County Career

Service C o u n c i l i t s members and employees,-to-certify f u l l y to t h i s Court,
with.ln 30 days, a w r i t t e n t r a n s c r i p t of the record and proceedings held
before i t .
2.

That t h i s Court conduct a review of t h e t r a n s c r i p t of the

hearing before the Career Service.Council, consider the memorandum of law
to be f i l e d at a l a t e r date by petitioner, take oral argument on the issues
raised herein, render a decision and order compelling the Salt Lake County
Career Service Council to reverse i t s decision sustaining the termination
of the petitioner and issue amended findings of f a c t , conclusions of law
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and an order compelling the Salt Lake County Attorney's office to reinstate
the petitioner with full back pay and benefits and reasonable attorney's
fees.
DATED this *2\f day of January 1988.
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH

LViZa'pe 6111
*
Attorneys for Petitioner
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DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
JERRY G. CAMPBELL (#0555)
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State, #S3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190
Telephone: (801) 468-2653
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RALPH TOLMAN,
Petitioner,
vs.

OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
SUBMIT NEW EVIDENCE

SALT LAKE CAREER SERVICE
COUNCIL and SALT LAKE
COUNTY ATTORNEY,

Civil No. C-88-373
Judge Frank G. Noel

Respondents.

Respondant, Salt Lake County Attorney, hereby objects to
Petitioner's Motion for an order allowing the submission of
alleged new evidence on the basis that a memorandum written
by deputy Jerry G. Campbell to Bill Hyde is irrelevant,
immaterial and constitutes attorney work product.
This Motion is more fully set forth in the accompanying
memoranda.
DATED this

/

day of September, 1989.
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney

Bv (_/SsU^\

t /

(SVL.CSX»/.JC/.£#

JEpRY G. CAMPBELL
/
Deputy County Attorney

OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION
Civil No. C-88-373
Page two

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this
1989,

a copy

of

the

foregoing

day of September,

Objection

to Petitioner's

Motion For Leave to Submit New Evidence was mailed, postage
prepaid, to the following:
L. Zane Gill
Attorney for Petitioner
50 West Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

;?u4u^
C138+(6&7)

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
JERRY G. CAMPBELL (#0555)
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State, #S3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190
Telephone: (801) 468-2653
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RALPH TOLMAN,
Petitioner,
vs.

MEMORANDA IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITIONER'S MOTION
TO SUBMIT NEW EVIDENCE

SALT LAKE CAREER SERVICE
COUNCIL and SALT LAKE
COUNTY ATTORNEY,

Civil No. C-88-373
Judge Frank G. Noel

Respondents.
Respondent, Salt Lake County Attorney by and through its
attorney, Jerry G. Campbell, hereby responds to Petitioner's
Motion for leave to submit new evidence in the above-entitled
matter.
The Petitioner requests this Court to rule that he may
submit

a confidential memorandum dated September 6, 1986,

from Jerry Campbell, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, to
William R. Hyde, Chief Deputy of the Civil Division.
FACTS
In

September

of

1986, Jerry

G.

Campbell's

immediate

supervisor was Ralph Crockett who responded to the division
chief, William R. Hyde (see attached affidavits of William
R. Hyde and Jerry G. Campbell).

MEMORANDA IN OPPOSITION
Civil No. C-88-373
Page 2

This inter-office memo was written prior to the notice
of intent to terminate Ralph Tolman.
allegations

and

probabilities

The memo discussed the

of

success

under

circumstances that existed in late August of 1986.

the

The Memo

was reviewed by William R. Hyde, Donald Sawaya, Chief Deputy
of the Governmental

Services Division, and Donald Harmon,

Chief Agent in charge of the Investigative Division.
It was the opinion of Don Harmon, Bill Hyde and Don
Sawaya

that

Ralph

Tolman

should

be

terminated

from

his

employment with the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office and
if the evidence did not sustain the termination before the
Salt Lake County Career Service Council, the office would
accept

the

results.

Jerry

Campbell

did

not

have

the

authority to decide whether or not to terminate or recommend
disciplinary action.
Subsequent
Campbell

and

to

the memo

Sam

Dawson

of

of

September
the

6,

1986,

Investigative

Jerry

Division

interviewed Margo Bergvall and Dave Nielsen concerning the
allegation of assault and battery.

At this interview, it

was determined that an additional incident on June 11, 1986,
had

occurred.

subsequently
Service

Said

notice

of

intent

amended

before

the

Salt

Council

(Transcript

p.14,

19-25; p.19, L.l-3; p.33, L.21-23).

to
Lake

L.22-25;

terminate

was

County

Career

p.15,

L.l-5,

The second incident on

MEMORANDA IN OPPOSITION
Civil No. C-88-373
Page 3

June 11, 1986, occurred at approximately 8:00 a.m when Ralph
Tolman was on his way to work.

He forced entry into Margo

Bergvall's house and proceeded to assault Dave Nielsen, said
acts constituting elements of a burglary.
Subsequent to the Notice of Termination, William R. Hyde
was appointed by the Salt Lake County Commission as Acting
Salt Lake County Attorney (Transcript p.376, L.22-25; p.377,
L.l-7).

William R. Hyde reviewed the allegations of the

Notice of Termination and had the authority to rescind or
amend the disciplinary action.
there

were

sufficient

William Hyde concluded that

allegations

to

proceed

with

the

termination (Transcript p.381, L.2-11).
The

confidential

inter-office

memo

was

written

on

September 6, 1986, and had no bearing on the decision of the
Salt Lake County Career Service Council. Additionally, new
information was discovered after its origination.
COUNTY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT
The

Salt

Lake

County

Career

Service

Council

is

an

independent body created by the County Personnel Management
Act, Section 17-33-1 et.seq., Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended.

§17-33-4

employee disputes.
binding

appeal

Commissioners.

gives

them

the

power

to

resolve

all

The Council is empowered to make "final,
decisions"

to

The Council must

the
render

Board

of

County

a decision based

MEMORANDA IN OPPOSITION
Civil No- C-88-373
Page 4

upon the evidence before it and there is nothing contained
in the record

filed with this Court

indicating

they did

otherwise.
The confidential inter-office memo discussing the points
of termination, their strengths and weaknesses, written by
an

attorney

disciplinary

who

was

action

not

is not

in

a

position

relevant

or

to

recommend

material

to

the

decision made by the Salt Lake County Career Service Council
and said memo is governed by the Attorney Work Product rule.
DATED this

/

day of September, 1989.
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney

Deputy Co*unty Attorney
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this

day of September,

1989, a copy of the Memoranda in Opposition to Petitioner's
Motion For Leave to Submit New Evidence was mailed, postage
prepaid, to the following:
L. Zane Gill
Attorney for Petitioner
50 West Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

^Z^TU^
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DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
JERRY G. CAMPBELL (#0555)
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State, #S3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190
Telephone: (801) 468-2653
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RALPH TOLMAN,
AFFIDAVIT

Petitioner,
vs.
SALT LAKE CAREER SERVICE
COUNCIL and SALT LAKE
COUNTY ATTORNEY,

Civil No- C-88-373
Judge Frank G. Noel

Respondents.

STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)
:ss
)

Affiant, WILLIAM R. HYDE, being duly sworn, deposes and
states as follows:
1.

That he is the Chief Deputy of the Civil Division,

Salt Lake County Attorney's Office.
2.

That

in

September

of

1986, Jerry

G.

Campbell's

immediate supervisor was Ralph Crockett.
3.

That he was Ralph Crockett's immediate supervisor in

September of 1986.
4.

That

confidential

on

September

inter-office

memo

6,

1986,
from

he

Jerry

received
G.

a

Campbell,

AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM R. HYDE
Civil No. C-88-373
Page 2

Deputy

County

Attorney,

Tolman.

The memo

whether

termination

regarding

termination

analyzed the allegations
would

be

of

Ralph

and questioned

sustainable.

The

memo

was

reviewed by Donald Sawaya, Chief Deputy of the Governmental
Services Division, Donald Harmon, Chief Agent in charge of
the Investigative Division, and your affiant.
decision

and

recommendation

to

the

County

It was their
Attorney

that

Ralph Tolman be terminated from his employment with the Salt
Lake County Attorney's Office.
5.

That Jerry G. Campbell did not have the authority to

recommend termination or hiring of any individual.
6.

That subsequent to the Notice of Termination, he was

appointed Acting Salt Lake County Attorney with authority to
rescind or amend the disciplinary action.
7.
Notice

That your affiant reviewed the allegations of the
of

Intent

circumstances

of

to

Terminate

and

concluded

the allegations warranted

that

the

termination of

Ralph Tolman.
8.
pending

That

the

litigation

Said memo was

not

confidential
within

the

authorized

written for publication.

memo
County
to be

was

an

analysis

Attorney's
released

of

Office.

nor was it

AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM R. HYDE
Civil No. C-88-373
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DATED this

Subscribed

day of September, 198.9

and sworn to before me on this

f **

day of

September, 1989.

NOTARY PUBLIC, residing in S/lt
Lake County, State/of Utah
^XCINDY G. YOUNGREN
3631 Summer Hilt Or
San LJKe City. Utah 8412^
My Commission Expires
November 2 1992

STATE OF UTAH
C142 +

t

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
JERRY G. CAMPBELL (#0555)
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State, #S3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190
Telephone: (801) 468-2653
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RALPH TOLMAN,
Petitioner,

AFFIDAVIT

vs •
SALT LAKE CAREER SERVICE
COUNCIL and SALT LAKE
COUNTY ATTORNEY,

Civil No. C-88-373
Judge Frank G. Noel

Respondents.

STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

ss
)

Affiant, JERRY G. CAMPBELL, being duly sworn, deposes
and states as follows:
1.
2.

That he is a Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney.
That

supervisor

during

September

of

1986,

in the Civil Division was Ralph

his

immediate

Crockett who

responded to division chief, William R. Hyde-.
3.

That on September 6, 1986, he wrote a confidential

inter-office
termination

memo
of

to

William

R.

Ralph

Tolman.

The

Hyde
memo

regarding

the

analyzed

the

AFFIDAVIT OF JERRY G. CAMPBELL
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allegations

and

questioned

whether

termination

reviewed

by William

would

be

sustainable.
4.
Donald

That

the memo was

Sawaya, Chief

Deputy of the Governmental

R. Hyde,
Services

Division, and Donald Harmon, Chief Agent in charge of the
Investigative

Division

and

it

was

their

opinion

and

recommendation that Ralph Tolman be terminated from the Salt
Lake County Attorney's office.
5.

That he did not have the authority

to recommend

termination or hiring of any individual.
6.

That the confidential memorandum dated September 6,

1986, to William R. Hyde, was not written for dissemination
to any person other than those listed in this Affidavit.
The

memo

prepared

by your

affiant

analyzed

the

charges

listed against Ralph Tolman and did not consider additional
information dicovered at a later date.
DATED this

/

day of September, 1989.

AFFIDAVIT OF JERRY G* CAMPBELL
C i v i l No- C - 8 8 - 3 7 3
Page 3

Subscribed
September,

and sworn t o

before

me

1989.

NOTARY PU
Salt Lak
ommW&PWIB&reb

CINDY G. YOUNGREN
3631 Summer Hill Or
OattLako City. Utah 8*121
My Commission Expires
November 2,1992
MaT^^ROFUTAH

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

)

JERRY G. CAMPBELL, being duly sworn, states that he is the
attorney for Respondent Salt Lake County Attorney and that he served
four (4) copies of the Brief of Respondent Salt Lake County Attorney
upon L. Zane Gill, Attorney for Appellant, 50 West Broadway, #900,
Salt Lake^City, Utah
the _ j L 5 d a y of

84101, by delivering true copies thereof, on
fak^^

, 1990.

Vi G4 CAMPBELL
Deputy^County Attorney
Attorney for Respondent

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
of

day

, 1990.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in the State of Utah
My commission expires:

